it experiences Van der Waals forces, gravitational pull. It experiences the impact after a fall.
None of that occurs in a complex, self-referential way. That would require more information flow pathways, such as those found in biological systems. A pebble doesn’t integrate or process these interactions; it simply exists within the framework of these forces.
Fundamental forces themselves, however, might be perceived as basic qualia. For example, the "experience" of being pulled by gravity or the microscopic interactions of van der Waals forces could be considered a rudimentary form of sensation. But this is far removed from the rich, multifaceted qualia experienced by biological organisms.
The key difference lies in complexity and structure. Biological systems, especially those with nervous systems, have evolved mechanisms that transform raw inputs into integrated experiences. These systems rely on:
Information flow and integration: Neurons and other signaling pathways allow living organisms to process, interpret, and respond to their environment in dynamic ways.
Feedback loops and self-reference: Conscious beings can "reflect" on their experiences, creating layers of awareness.
Purpose and adaptation: Biological systems interpret inputs in ways that serve survival, growth, or reproduction, giving their qualia a functional dimension.
A pebble lacks these capabilities. Its interactions with the world are static and non-adaptive. The "qualia" it experiences — if we accept panpsychism — are unstructured and elemental, arising purely from the fundamental forces acting upon it. In this way, a pebble's experience might resemble the "zero-point" of qualia: a bare, formless interaction with the universe, without interpretation or meaning.
I appreciate the extensive outlined reply to this question as I have often pondered where and how or what the demarcation is between consciousness as possibly experienced by other natural substances/unified systems organized in structures composed of matter and materials (animals, plants, minerals). This has given me something to think about! Thank you for sharing 🙏
Consciousness is the fundamental of reality in the metaphorical sense - reality is the aspects of the universe accessible to a mind, but that exists on top of the physical substrate upon which it is dependent. This is ontology, that interdependent distinction between Reality as it is to us and Actuality as it is beyond us. We sense Actuality though biological/physical, subconscious/cultural, and psychological/personal filters; reality-to-us, and Reality per-se is the consensus version.
So our individual embodied reality, our phenomenological/spiritual self is the substrate of everything else we know and are, but even that is contingent on the physical. The physical is more primary bc it is more encompassing.
Thats exactly why I was interested in your perspective on these ideas, especially given your clear commitment to scientific rigor and logical consistency.
Thank you! - looking at the first part again, I see I wasn't clear enough about my position. When I say consciousness is fundamental, I'm not suggesting it exists at the basis of reality, beneath a physical substrate, or that it's metaphorical. Rather, I'm proposing a neutral monist framework where both physical reality and consciousness are manifestations of the same underlying substance.
The later parts of the series develop this idea more precisely, particularly in the formalization of how both subjective experience and objective reality arise from this common foundation. I think you'll find it offers an interesting alternative to emergence theory.
“We find these worries re-emerging at the start of the scientific revolution, as the mechanistic picture of the world inaugurated by Galileo, Descartes and Newton put the problem of the mind at center stage while paradoxically sweeping it under the rug. Galileo’s mathematisation of nature seemed to leave no space for the qualities we find in experience: the redness of the tomato, the spiciness of the paprika, the sweet smell of flowers. Galileo’s solution, in a move reminiscent of Democritus, was to strip matter of such sensory qualities. This led to the distinction between “primary qualities”—such as
shape,
size and
motion
—which were thought to really exist in matter, and “secondary qualities”—such as
colours,
odours and
tastes
—which were thought to exist only in the mind of the observer (or to exist as powers to cause ideas in the minds of observers). Galileo and Descartes did not take the radical Democritian step of denying the existence of the secondary qualities; instead they placed them in the soul. However, this of course led to a radical form of dualism, with a sharp metaphysical division between souls with their secondary qualities and bodies with their primary qualities.
In opposition to this dualism, the panpsychist views of Spinoza (1632–77) and Leibniz (1646–1716) can be seen as attempts to provide a more unified picture of nature. Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God Himself. In the illustrative scholium to proposition seven of book two of the Ethics ([1677] 1985) Spinoza writes:
a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing … therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought … we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes…”
How does a pebble experience qualia? Is this a question I can ask?
Of course you can!
it experiences Van der Waals forces, gravitational pull. It experiences the impact after a fall.
None of that occurs in a complex, self-referential way. That would require more information flow pathways, such as those found in biological systems. A pebble doesn’t integrate or process these interactions; it simply exists within the framework of these forces.
Fundamental forces themselves, however, might be perceived as basic qualia. For example, the "experience" of being pulled by gravity or the microscopic interactions of van der Waals forces could be considered a rudimentary form of sensation. But this is far removed from the rich, multifaceted qualia experienced by biological organisms.
The key difference lies in complexity and structure. Biological systems, especially those with nervous systems, have evolved mechanisms that transform raw inputs into integrated experiences. These systems rely on:
Information flow and integration: Neurons and other signaling pathways allow living organisms to process, interpret, and respond to their environment in dynamic ways.
Feedback loops and self-reference: Conscious beings can "reflect" on their experiences, creating layers of awareness.
Purpose and adaptation: Biological systems interpret inputs in ways that serve survival, growth, or reproduction, giving their qualia a functional dimension.
A pebble lacks these capabilities. Its interactions with the world are static and non-adaptive. The "qualia" it experiences — if we accept panpsychism — are unstructured and elemental, arising purely from the fundamental forces acting upon it. In this way, a pebble's experience might resemble the "zero-point" of qualia: a bare, formless interaction with the universe, without interpretation or meaning.
I appreciate the extensive outlined reply to this question as I have often pondered where and how or what the demarcation is between consciousness as possibly experienced by other natural substances/unified systems organized in structures composed of matter and materials (animals, plants, minerals). This has given me something to think about! Thank you for sharing 🙏
I appreciate your interest 😊
The following parts in this series also delve deeper into the specifics 🔎
So if you're into the topic, I'm sure you'll find plenty food for thought 😁
Consciousness is the fundamental of reality in the metaphorical sense - reality is the aspects of the universe accessible to a mind, but that exists on top of the physical substrate upon which it is dependent. This is ontology, that interdependent distinction between Reality as it is to us and Actuality as it is beyond us. We sense Actuality though biological/physical, subconscious/cultural, and psychological/personal filters; reality-to-us, and Reality per-se is the consensus version.
So our individual embodied reality, our phenomenological/spiritual self is the substrate of everything else we know and are, but even that is contingent on the physical. The physical is more primary bc it is more encompassing.
Thats exactly why I was interested in your perspective on these ideas, especially given your clear commitment to scientific rigor and logical consistency.
Thank you! - looking at the first part again, I see I wasn't clear enough about my position. When I say consciousness is fundamental, I'm not suggesting it exists at the basis of reality, beneath a physical substrate, or that it's metaphorical. Rather, I'm proposing a neutral monist framework where both physical reality and consciousness are manifestations of the same underlying substance.
The later parts of the series develop this idea more precisely, particularly in the formalization of how both subjective experience and objective reality arise from this common foundation. I think you'll find it offers an interesting alternative to emergence theory.
Looking forward to your thoughts as you read on!
“We find these worries re-emerging at the start of the scientific revolution, as the mechanistic picture of the world inaugurated by Galileo, Descartes and Newton put the problem of the mind at center stage while paradoxically sweeping it under the rug. Galileo’s mathematisation of nature seemed to leave no space for the qualities we find in experience: the redness of the tomato, the spiciness of the paprika, the sweet smell of flowers. Galileo’s solution, in a move reminiscent of Democritus, was to strip matter of such sensory qualities. This led to the distinction between “primary qualities”—such as
shape,
size and
motion
—which were thought to really exist in matter, and “secondary qualities”—such as
colours,
odours and
tastes
—which were thought to exist only in the mind of the observer (or to exist as powers to cause ideas in the minds of observers). Galileo and Descartes did not take the radical Democritian step of denying the existence of the secondary qualities; instead they placed them in the soul. However, this of course led to a radical form of dualism, with a sharp metaphysical division between souls with their secondary qualities and bodies with their primary qualities.
In opposition to this dualism, the panpsychist views of Spinoza (1632–77) and Leibniz (1646–1716) can be seen as attempts to provide a more unified picture of nature. Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God Himself. In the illustrative scholium to proposition seven of book two of the Ethics ([1677] 1985) Spinoza writes:
a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing … therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought … we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes…”
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)